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1. Introduction
Why does my imagination form the idea that I have one diachronic iden-
tity? I will argue that this is the question which Hume asks himself when 
he reflects on personal identity in the first book of his Treatise on Human 
Nature. Subsequently, I will recite Hume’s initial answer to this question, 
as well as the problem he, in the Treatise’s appendix, famously admitted 
1 This article has benefited from the comments of Arnold Burms, Galen Strawson, 
a blind reviewer of Prolegomena, and the audiences at the summer school “Phenomenol-
ogy and Philosophy of Mind” of the subjectivity center in Copenhagen, as well as at the 
conferences “David Hume and contemporary philosophy” in Moscow, “Bucharest Gradu-
ate Conference in Early Modern Philosophy” in Romania, and “ASSC 15” in Kyoto. The 
research for this article was funded by the FWO.
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to have with this answer. I will then explain how Hume could save his ac-
count of the formation of our idea of personal identity, if he would refer to 
insights which he developed elsewhere and then choose not to apply to the 
case of personal identity; i.e. if he would consider the role of contiguity in 
the constitution of our idea of personal identity.
2. A question about our imagination, rather than about the 
ontological features of personal identity
Hume’s discussion of personal identity has been widely commented on 
and there is disagreement among philosophers about the kind of question 
which Hume here addresses. Some hold that Hume tries to determine what 
selves are and then finds out that there is a problem with his ontological 
description of these selves.2 Others are convinced that Hume is more in-
terested in the working of our imagination and cannot find out what gives 
someone the idea that he is both a synchronically unified and diachroni-
cally existing self.3
Although both Hume’s section on personal identity and its appen-
dix in his Treatise begin with some ontological claims about the self and 
the mind, his text validates the latter interpretation. Hume examines how, 
given certain ontological facts, the imagination still forms the idea that we 
are a self with a synchronic unity and a diachronic existence.
The ontological facts are that selves “are nothing but a bundle or col-
lection of different perceptions” (I.iv.6 253),4 and that the mind “is a kind 
of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance” 
(I.iv.6 254), but that “[t]here is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor 
identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine 
that simplicity and identity” (I.iv.6 254).
The question which follows is: “What then gives us so great a pro-
pension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to sup-
pose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ 
the whole course of our lives?” (I.iv.6 253).
2 See for example Don Garrett (1981) and Susan Mendus (1980).
3 See for example Galen Strawson (2011). Note that, even when one holds that Hu-
me’s problem concerns the working of the imagination, rather than the definition or de-
scription of selves, one can still claim that Hume’s problem is ontological. Galen Strawson 
argues for example that Hume realizes that he has failed to identify one ontological princi-
ple that would explain the working of the imagination. 
4 Page numbers refer to the edition of the Treatise edited by Selby-Bigge: Hume 
(1978). Italics are Hume’s. I use bold to emphasize when Hume’s language indicates 
whether he talks about ontological facts or about the imagination.
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Hume initially answers that this inclination follows from our percep-
tion of resemblance and assumption of causality:
The only question, therefore, which remains, is, by what relations this un-
interrupted progress of our thought is produc’d, when we consider the 
successive existence of a mind or thinking person. And here ‘tis evident we 
must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, and must drop conti-
guity, which has little or no influence in the present case. (I.iv.6 260)
It is to this answer, and thus to the question about imagination, that he 
comes back in his appendix.
In his appendix Hume again first addresses an ontological question: 
“Is self the same with substance?” (Appendix 635). He says that this ques-
tion does not really make sense, because we have in any case no evidence 
of an existing self or substance distinct from the particular perceptions. 
Hume has no problem with this answer of his: “So far I seem to be at-
tended with sufficient evidence” (ibid.). He only worries about how the 
imagination then forms the idea of a self:
But having thus loosen’d all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to 
explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes 
us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my 
account is very defective. (ibid.)
A little bit later he says “the thought alone finds personal identity” (ibid.) 
And again he explains what makes him despair: “But all my hopes vanish, 
when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive percep-
tions in our thought or consciousness” (Appendix 635–636).
3. Hume’s problem with his account of personal identity
With this question in view, let us further examine it. Why does our im-
agination form the idea that we have one diachronic identity? Two ob-
servations make Hume ask this question. First, Hume observes that some 
philosophers have the idea that we are each one self which persists through 
time (I.iv.6 251). Secondly, he assumes that all ideas are derived from im-
pressions and he looks for the impression of such a persisting self. Yet, he 
cannot find any such impression (ibid.). From this Hume’s question fol-
lows: if there is no such impression, where then does the idea of being a 
persisting self derive from?
Hume initially answers his own question by saying that there are 
different relations which are not themselves relations of identity, but 
the perception of which can make us think that there is one object (in 
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this case a self) which persists. These different relations make us as-
sume that there must be an object which explains the occurrence of 
distinct impressions (in casu, one self which has distinct impressions) 
and which relates them to one another. Hume identifies the relations 
which make us think that there must be one such identical object as 
those of resemblance, causality and contiguity (I.iv.6 254–260), but 
he specifies that it is evident that contiguity does not have a part in 
the constitution of our idea of personal identity. According to Hume, 
the observation of resemblance and the assumption of causality suf-
fice for this particular constitution (I.iv.6 260). We have memories of 
events which resemble the original experience of these events. This 
makes us assume that we must be one and the same subject who first 
experienced and now remembers these events. And it seems as if one 
perception (for example, the feeling of hunger) can cause another idea 
(for example, the will to get something to eat). This again makes us 
assume that we are one subject which has both of these thoughts and 
acts on them.
In his appendix to the Treatise Hume expresses to be dissatisfied 
with this answer, because it does not explain what motivates the imagi-
nation to connect certain impressions in such a way that this makes us 
assume that there is one persisting self (Appendix 635–636). The fact 
that we perceive resemblances or assume causality between different 
impressions does not really explain this, because, first, we also assume 
that all these impressions could occur without being related to one an-
other (Appendix 634 and 636), and, second, we do not perceive any 
connections between these impressions which determine that they must 
be had by the same subject (Appendix 635 and 636). Hume holds that 
this gap in his explanation would be bridged if our perceptions would 
“either inhere in something simple and individual” (Appendix 636), or 
if the mind did “perceive some real connexion among them” (Appendix 
636).
I suggest that Hume could find what he is looking for, if he would 
consider the role of contiguity in the constitution of our idea of personal 
identity. He would then save his analysis by appealing to a criterion con-
stitutive of identity which he first identified but then left out.
In what follows I will first elaborate on the role of this contiguity in 
the constitution of our idea of personal identity. This section (section 4) 
is a reflection on what may constitute our idea of personal identity, more 
than it is a reflection on Hume. Subsequently (section 5), I will explicate 
how acknowledging this role of contiguity could save Hume’s account of 
the genesis of our idea of being a diachronic self.
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4. The role of contiguity in the constitution 
of our idea of personal identity
4.1 An introductory sketch
In my description of the role of contiguity in the genesis of our idea of be-
ing a diachronically existing self I will assume that this idea is mostly an 
idea of a particular mental subject or mind, because this is Hume’s starting 
point and I wish to offer a solution to his problem. Still, in the origina-
tion of an idea of a mental self, the observation of certain physical facts 
may have a part. I will argue that it does. Hume should be sympathetic to 
this possibility, since he noticed something analogous; i.e. that our idea 
of identity comes about through our perception of diversity. According 
to Hume we often get the idea of identity by associating resembling, yet 
diverse, non-identical perceptions.
In what follows I will point to different instances of contiguity which 
are constitutive of our idea of a self. I will argue that our experience of 
these contiguities makes us assume that all perceptions which are pro-
duced by the same body belong to the same self.
4.2 We assume that all perceptions produced by the same 
body belong to the same self
Before I trace which and how contiguities exactly constitute our idea of 
being one self, let me exemplify that their effect is real: we assume that all 
perceptions produced by the same body belong to the same self.
This is so in the case of other selves. In biographies (and autobiog-
raphies alike) we include as actions in the subject’s life everything done 
in whatever consciousness which is produced by a body continuous to 
her current body; even, and often especially, that which is foreign to her 
general way of behaving. This does not change when the current subject 
can no longer identify herself with these actions, or no longer remembers 
them. For instance, even if we do not choose to imprison a German with 
Alzheimer’s for the nazi-crimes which a German with a body continuous 
to his committed some fifty years earlier, on the grounds that the forget-
ting of this Alzheimer’s patient prevents him from taking responsibility 
for these deeds, a biographer will still write about this German as being 
one and the same person. He will write that there was once a particular 
German who committed nazi-crime, yet remained unpunished because he 
got Alzheimer’s. Also, when a prince suddenly does something unprincely 
which is not in line with his character and which he later no longer identi-
fies with, biographers will definitely mention that he, that is this particular 
prince, once did this.
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Another illustration of the fact that we consider others to still be the 
same self as long as they have the same body is this. When we see a baby, 
we assume that if we at a later stage are able to physically trace this crea-
ture, we will see what kind of self he has become. Again, we do not track 
this self by his character traits or remaining memory, but merely by his 
physical continuity.
We think about ourselves in the same way. We recognize that we may 
have done things which we no longer remember, as well as that our physi-
cal presence at a certain event determines whether we were present at this 
event. Even when we say that we were not ourselves when we did some-
thing, we assume that we did this and just try to give a causal explanation 
of what may have prompted us to act in this unusual way. We can also 
recognize that there was a period in which we had a quite different charac-
ter, say when we were a teenager. We can even tell that this was the case, 
when we do not remember how we were then. Someone else, who we be-
lieve, could have informed us about this. And we can continue to, perhaps 
shamefully, recognize that we were once such a teenager, even when the 
way in which we think now makes it impossible for us to understand what 
could ever have brought us to do what we did when we were this teenager. 
When we explain in such a case, as we might, that we have changed a lot 
over the years, this expresses that we assume that there is a sense in which 
we are still the same self as this teenager. If not, we would say that there 
was just one self then and another self now, instead of that there was some-
one who changed. Yet, there are no mental connections between us and 
this teenager: we do not remember what she did; we no longer think in the 
same way; and we cannot even conceive how our current thoughts could 
ever have evolved out of the way in which the teenager thought. Between 
us now and the teenager then there is only a physical connection: the body 
we have now is physically continuous with the body the teenager had. 
This body is the basis upon which others decided that there is a sense in 
which we are the same person as the teenager was and, since we here took 
the word of others, it also made us conclude that there must be a sense in 
which we are still the same self as this teenager.
4.3 Two self-constituting contiguities
The question is then: what makes us attribute all those perceptions to the 
same self which are produced by one and the same body? I hypothesize 
that we are brought to this through our observation of two kind of conti-
guities, i.e. the nearness of our mental experiences to where we physically 
situate ourselves, and the apparent continuity of our body.
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4.3.1 Contiguities of the mental and the physical
I will first enumerate some examples of how experiences of the contigu-
ity between the mental and the physical may have stimulated us to tie our 
personal history to that of whichever conscious being lives through one 
particular body.
(1) A first example is this. Reality and evolution may have taught us 
that if we are to survive mentally, we will also have to survive physically, 
and perhaps also that if we want to stay physically okay, we will have to 
be mindful. Thus, taking care of ourselves could have started to mean that 
we have to both be good to our mind and take care of our body. I here say 
“taking care of ourselves could have started to mean…”, which at first 
sight may seem to imply that we already have an idea of what it means 
to be a self, before we realize what it means to take care of ourselves. 
However, the contrary is also possible. We may have started to take care 
of ourselves through a series of instinctive, and possibly evolutionary de-
termined acts, before our experience of this common practice gave us the 
idea that we have a substantial diachronic existence and that our fate is 
tied up with our physical and mental histories.
(2) Further, both the fact that we constantly locate our sensations on a 
particular body, i.e. that we feel them there, and the fact that others recog-
nize our emotions by looking at what our body expresses, may have made 
us think that we are where our bodies are.
This thought of being where our bodies are gives us a sense of dia-
chronicity (and so a particular sense of being a self) which purely mental 
experiences would not give us. Purely mental experiences appear to us as 
current or as just past. In addition they can make us assume that we must 
already live for a while. This for example happens when we experience 
that it is not a surprise for us to know that Brussels is the capital of Bel-
gium, even if we do not remember when we learned this. Still these men-
tal experiences do not give us the idea which we actually have, i.e. that 
we were always somewhere at one particular time. If we locate ourselves 
where our body is, we do get this idea. This is so, because we have the idea 
that one physical body does not disappear and regenerate, but has instead 
one continuous existence.
(3) A third example of how the closeness of the mental to the physical 
could constitute our idea of being a self is this. We notice that we are able 
to execute our plans with one particular body. Our capacity to form and 
execute plans gives us a sense of agency. Thus, the contiguity between our 
mental thoughts and a moving body gives us a sense of effectiveness and 
integrity, and so a sense of self. I have said “we notice that we are able to 
execute our plans with one particular body”. This again seems to imply 
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that we already have a sense of being a self before we find out that we are 
able to execute our plans with one particular body. This does not really 
matter. We may have a minimal sense of having a will and thus being a self 
with a will. As soon as we realize that we are systematically able to act on 
this will, that we do this through one body, and that this makes others rec-
ognize us as the same acting self, this gives us a fuller and different picture 
of ourselves. It helps to constitute our feeling that we are one and the same 
recognizable self. We realize that we are bound up with one specific body 
and that we can have effects on this world.
(4) Fourthly, we notice that our memories coincide with the physical 
history of the body we inhabit: we typically only remember those events at 
which our current body was present. This frequent coincidence of events 
in our mental history with those in a particular physical history may also 
be part of what motivates us to assume that our mental history completely 
coincides with the history of the body we inhabit: i.e. that we were the 
ones who thought whatever thoughts this body processed.
This would in any case explain something that Hume requires theo-
rizers of personal identity to explain,5 namely why we assume that events 
of our past may have caused a current thought, even when we no longer 
remember these events. Hume here wonders why we think that some pre-
vious event may have caused a current thought, even though we have no 
idea which previous event this could have been, because we have no mem-
ories of a specific previous event which could have caused this thought. 
We just assume that there could be a mental causation between a previous 
event and a current thought, without knowing more about the specifics of 
this mental causation or previous event. Hume argues that this assump-
tion is a consequence of the fact that our memories have shown us how 
some thoughts we have are caused by previous thoughts. He holds that our 
acquaintance with this fact makes us assume that, even when there is no 
memory of some thought, this thought may have caused a thought we have 
now. Hume concludes that our memory allows us to go beyond memory 
and integrate experiences in our life which we do not remember. Yet, he 
leaves it to anyone who has a theory about how we form the idea that we 
have a personal identity, to explain how this happens.
When we show that and how we start associating our mental history 
with our physical history, we explain this. If we establish that and why 
we think that events in both histories coincide, we also explain why we 
still assume that there is one particular history in which events took place 
5 Cfr. Hume (1978: I.iv.6, p. 262): “ ‘Twill be incumbent on those, who affirm that 
memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend 
our identity beyond our memory.”
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which caused our current thoughts, even when we no longer have access 
to our mental history of that period. We may not be able to trace this men-
tal history, because we have forgotten part of it. But the physical history 
of a human body is one and, in principle, always traceable. If we assume 
that this physical history coincides with our mental history, and so that 
whatever we thought once, we thought at one specific place at one spe-
cific moment, namely at the place where this body found itself, then we 
have a way of locating the one history in which a previous event can have 
caused a current thought, even though we no longer have access to the 
whole mental part of this previous history. Without still being conscious 
of everything we experienced, we can just assume that we have been con-
scious during major parts of the time that we physically existed and that 
there are thoughts we had during this time which shaped our thinking now, 
even though we may now have forgotten which these thoughts were. For 
example, if we now get the feeling of being at home when we smell some-
thing specific, then we may assume that we must have smelled this smell 
at home when we were a child and that this now makes us associate it with 
being home, even though we do not specifically remember the occasion at 
which we initially smelled this smell.
One might object to the idea that the coincidence of our remembered 
experiences with events in the physical history of the body through which 
we live motivates us to think that all the thoughts processed by this body 
are ours. One might say that we must first have memories and thus also 
an idea of a self who experienced the remembered experiences, before 
we can associate this history with a certain physical history. The objec-
tion would then be that we here do not deal with a contiguity between the 
mental and the physical which then initiates an idea of the self, but that we 
already have an idea of a self, before we start noticing this coincidence. To 
this I reply that our memories may never have come to our mind as they 
do, if our constant experience of being located while we experience things 
did not make us assume that we have a particular past which stretches 
back beyond any mental thought we might have of it. Our experience that 
we are always somewhere, as long as we are, may be what makes us ex-
perience certain representations as memories: it may make us situate them 
in the one real past which we must have – unlike some other fantasies we 
might have. It may also be what evokes memories: it may make us associ-
ate a current event with a past event, because it makes us assume that we 
have one real past which could help us make sense of our life and is thus 
interesting to return to.
It is then as it seems: we follow a self through something external to 
the self. Yet, this does not mean that this idea of the self would already 
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be there before we follow it through this externality. The latter makes our 
idea of the self possible.
(5) Lastly, we should consider the fact that others often recognize us 
by our outer appearance. They assume that someone with the same body 
will still be the same self, because this is time and again corroborated: 
every time they see the same creature physically speaking, this creature 
seems to have a similar character; it thinks and acts in a similar way. This 
coherent character does not seem to develop itself independently, before 
it is recognized by others. Part of what stimulates the development of co-
herent selves appears to be the very fact that others recognize these selves 
through their bodies. Everyone is aware of the fact that others have certain 
expectations of them, based on what they have seen of them before. What 
they have seen, is certain recurrent behaviour, exhibited by the conscious 
being connected to one body. These expectations of others often have an 
influence on what you do now. You will often feel you have to meet these 
expectations and this may inhibit you from acting in certain ways. Hence, 
the expectation of others, can make us develop a coherent character and 
incite us to try to remember a specific history. It can give us the idea that 
we are a particular self and so make us into one. In this scenario, the gaze 
of others makes us follow ourselves through a physical continuity.
4.3.2 The apparent continuity of the body
So far my description of the possible role of the contiguity between the 
mental and the physical in the constitution of our idea of the self. I will 
now elaborate on the other constituting contiguity which I have mentioned 
briefly: this is the apparent continuity of bodies. This apparent continu-
ity makes it easy to follow a body through time. Hence, it reinforces our 
motivation to follow a particular person through a particular body. How 
does this happen?
You will forget that you had certain thoughts or feelings. In forgetting 
these, you also lose the connection to them through a feeling of mineness: 
when someone tells you that you had this thought, but you forgot it, you 
will not feel that it was yours, as you feel that your current experiences 
are yours. The feeling of mineness of experiences which connects you to 
some experiences in the past can thus not connect you to all the experi-
ences you ever had.
There is also no other way for thoughts to be attributed to you (be it 
by yourself or by others) on the basis of thoughts alone. For there is noth-
ing in the propositional content of thoughts which refers uniquely to you. 
In principle different persons can have the same thought propositionally 
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speaking. Neither do the different thoughts which you have in your life 
necessarily induce each other: one specific thought can lead to many dif-
ferent thoughts, or just not induce another thought at all. So there is no 
way here either for one thought to give you access to all the thoughts you 
ever had or will have.
Following yourself through your character alone is impossible for 
similar reasons. First, different persons can have the same character. Sec-
ondly, it is not possible to entirely predict how one character will develop 
and thus to derive from one or more character traits which past or future 
person you are numerically identical to. We are not cartoon figures who 
stick to a specific role. There are different possible ways for us to develop 
ourselves and we can suddenly do something unexpected.
A body, however, is less ephemeral than thoughts, memories and the 
feeling of mineness of particular experiences. It is continuous. At one par-
ticular time, it is always at one particular place and, if you trace it, there 
are no gaps between these places. Even if you are not always aware of this 
body or its place, you know that it is somewhere. A machine could track it 
constantly and tell you where it was at any one time.
This is not a coincidence. It belongs to the concept of a material body 
that it is really continuous, i.e. that all its parts are synchronically con-
nected, and diachronically evolve out of one another. This makes it easy 
for the theoretical mind to think of this continuity when it sees something 
which looks like a body.
In addition we also visually perceive the contiguity of a body: we do 
not really see its continuity (in principle we could be confronted by differ-
ent quick body flashes and just think that we perceive continuity), but we 
can follow an at least seemingly continuous body (when we keep our eyes 
open, we do not see it disappear and come back again and we see how it 
only displaces itself to an extent which we take such a body to be capable 
of in a particular time). Thus, apart from our theoretical mind, our impres-
sions equally tempt our mind to follow a body.
All of this together explains why we might be motivated to follow our 
diachronic existence through our bodies. Even when it would be a feeling 
of mineness which originates the association between a particular body 
and a particular person, and even when character recognition reinforces 
this original association, the mind may at some moment be motivated to 
follow the particular person to which it belongs through a particular body 
rather than through a feeling of mineness or set of specific character traits, 
because the association between a particular person and a particular body 
is already there and because conceptual and visual facts make it so much 
easier to follow the body.
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Note that the following of a person, is here the following of this per-
son through time. Generally, we all have the feeling that our thoughts and 
sensations are ours at the moment at which we have them. Just like this, 
we are typically aware of the fact that we have a certain character. When 
we speak or react, we can for example know that we defend certain values 
and have certain sensitivities. I do not wish to deny that this synchronous 
feeling of mineness and awareness of one’s character is crucial in the in-
stantaneous shaping of a sense of self. All I have here wanted to point out 
is that when we follow ourselves through time we sometimes just assume 
that we were where our bodies were, because it can be easier to find out 
where these bodies were than it can be to know whether you could have 
evolved out of a specific character, or than it can be to still have a memory 
of something this person experienced and so also to still feel that you are 
the one who experienced this.
5. Could Hume save his account of personal identity?
If all of this is convincing, could Hume then save his account of the gen-
esis of our idea of personal identity? I argue that he could. Let’s look again 
at what he identified as his problem and what, according to him, could 
solve it.
Hume wonders why we assume that particular resembling impres-
sions belong to one person and why we think that there should be a causal 
link between particular perceptions. This is unclear, because of the com-
bination of the facts that (1) we do not perceive a real connection between 
these impressions and (2) we could have every one impression without a 
particular other. It will be explained, says Hume, if we appear to perceive 
a real connection between these impressions or if they belong to a real 
entity.
These references to something real may surprise one, if one under-
stands that Hume’s question is here not whether there really is a self, but 
instead how we get the idea that we are diachronic selves. It is not im-
mediately evident why Hume expects that something real may have a part 
in the genesis of this idea. After all, he is the one who made us skeptical 
about whether our ideas correspond to something real. He argues that we 
cannot find out whether a particular idea corresponds to something real 
and that we can at most uncover whether a particular idea corresponds to a 
specific impression; and he shows, with the case of identity, that this does 
then not always prove to be so. According to Hume, some ideas, like those 
of identical objects and subjects, are clearly fictions to which no particular 
impression corresponds, but which originate after an association of differ-
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ent perceptions. Something real is the last thing from which these ideas 
seem to originate.
Taking this into account, I argue that Hume’s reference to the real 
could be explained as follows. Our mind might understand conceptually 
what it would mean for our perceptions to reside in something real or 
to have a real connection between them. This understanding could then 
make us associate specific perceptions with one another. Our associations 
of these perceptions would then neither be motivated by our perception 
of a real connection between these perceptions, nor by our observation 
of something ontologically real in which they reside. It would solely be 
prompted by our theoretical idea that there could be a specific real con-
nection between such impressions, or that such impressions could reside 
in something ontologically real. To explain the origination of this specific 
assumption like this, in no way ignores Hume’s skepticism. For it is still 
possible that when we get the impression that this real entity or connection 
is there, it is not there in fact. Our impressions might mislead us.
Say that the scenario I just sketched is a good depiction of the role 
which Hume could wish to attribute to the real in the constitution of our 
idea of being a diachronically existing self, how then could drawing re-
newed attention to this, help Hume to save his account of this constitu-
tion? To discover this, Hume would have to return to his observation that 
contiguity can make us think that something has a diachronic identity. He 
could then find the missing elements of his account in his own observa-
tions and demonstrate their role in the genesis of our idea of being a dia-
chronic self by appealing to the explication he already gave about what 
would explain such a genesis.
What are these elements and how do they generate our idea of be-
ing a diachronically existing self? They are instances of contiguity. This 
contiguity either consists in a nearness in time and space of the mental 
and the physical or in the apparent continuity of the body. Specifically, we 
for example experience that we always sense through the same body, that 
we can act on our intentions through a particular body, that we survive 
(mentally) when we take well care of a particular body, and that the body 
with which we feel connected has a continuous existence. All of this gives 
us an experience of a contiguity which is real. The contiguity between the 
mental and the physical is real because it has an effect on the world. The 
apparent continuity of the body is real because it is there, regardless of 
our individual subjective experience of it. It can be registered by others or 
machines.
We do not just undergo these experiences of a real contiguity. These 
experiences also make us think that the perceptions of one self may re-
side in an ontological reality, i.e. in a body-mind connection which has 
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an effect on the world and persists. This understanding of what a self 
could be is not a neutral finding. After our experience of real contigui-
ties generated our idea that we are a diachronically existing self, this 
understanding strengthens this idea. For when we have an idea of what 
it could mean to be such a self and we have experiences of something 
which seems to correspond to this idea, these experiences seem to pro-
vide evidence for the fact that the self of which we imagined that it could 
exist, really exists.
In this way, our idea of being a diachronically existing self could be 
generated by our observation of real contiguities (which are one form of 
connection) and the understanding that our perceptions reside in some-
thing ontologically real. This is exactly the kind of generation which 
Hume believed would account for the way in which our idea of being a 
diachronic self comes about, but which he did not discover the necessary 
elements for. I demonstrated how Hume could find these elements, if he 
would pay attention to the role of the observation of contiguity in the con-
stitution of our idea of being a diachronic self. This is a relation of which 
Hume was the first to so famously describe how it could make us assume 
identity6.
6 I have now suggested a way for Hume to save his account of the genesis of our idea 
of being a diachronic self. In doing so, I paid special attention to two elements of Hume’s 
account of personal identity, which have been further elaborated on in contemporary phi-
losophy of mind, but whose importance for the contemporary debate on personal identity 
remained mostly unnoticed. I repeat them in this note, so as to highlight that Hume should 
in this debate not merely be remembered as the predecessor of Parfit’s bundle theory of 
mind.
The first element is Hume’s recognition that the specific functioning of our self-con-
sciousness has a part in the genesis of our concepts. John Campbell (1994, 2002) is one 
of the contemporary philosophers who draws attention to this fact. The interesting point 
of Hume in this regard is his stress on the fact that the imagination may follow something 
like identity through something which we, upon reflection, do not value much in identity, 
or of which we even think that it does not constitute identity. This insight could alter the 
classical philosophical approach to the question of personal identity, according to which 
philosophers assume that what constitutes our idea of diachronic personal identity must be 
something of which it is immediately obvious to us that it is important for persons, such as 
psychological continuity which allows us to get in touch which our pasts, to feel guilty or 
proud about something, and to develop a character.
The second overseen, yet interesting element in Hume for contemporary philoso-
phy of mind is his explanation of how our perception of contiguity can make us think of 
identity. This idea returns in the work on personal identity of P.F. Strawson (1959), Gareth 
Evans (1982) and John McDowell (1997). They go even further than Hume and argue that 
the perception of this contiguity is necessary in the constitution of a diachronic self-con-
sciousness. I have argued that this additional insight could help Hume save his account of 
personal identity. But it is because of Hume that we first started to comprehend in which 
way this element could be important in the constitution of our idea of any identity.
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